Add semantic guardrail layer for prompt-injection pre-check
Extends the regex-only pre-check into three stages: regex scan, then embedding-similarity search against known injection examples, and only if that score clears a threshold, an LLM judge confirms intent before blocking. Catches paraphrased injection attempts the fixed regex patterns miss without paying for an LLM call on every query. Validated end-to-end against a real Anthropic API key and a live Qdrant instance: the new path correctly blocked a paraphrased injection (audit log confirms rule_id: injection.semantic_llm_judge) while a benign near-miss passed through without ever reaching the LLM judge. Also documents two reliability issues found while testing with claude-haiku-4-5 (a non-deterministic policy verdict and a forced tool-call loop that can end without calling any tool) in docs/SAFETY_WRITEUP.md section 6 -- unrelated to this change, but worth recording since they were found in the same pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -24,6 +24,16 @@ pub struct RetrievalOutput {
|
||||
pub extracted_reference: Option<String>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Structured output of the LLM injection judge (see
|
||||
/// `guardrails/injection_judge.rs`), called only when the semantic
|
||||
/// guardrail's embedding-similarity pre-filter flags a query as close
|
||||
/// enough to a known injection example to be worth a second opinion.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
|
||||
pub struct InjectionVerdict {
|
||||
pub is_injection: bool,
|
||||
pub reasoning: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
|
||||
pub struct PolicyVerdict {
|
||||
pub compliant: bool,
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user