diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 3fb68d5..ccafb92 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -14,18 +14,42 @@ trade-offs documented in [`docs/SAFETY_WRITEUP.md`](docs/SAFETY_WRITEUP.md).
 
 ## Architecture
 
-Three narrow agents behind a deterministic supervisor -- the supervisor is
-plain Rust control flow, not another LLM call, so *what's allowed through*
-is never itself something the model can be talked out of:
+Three narrow agents behind a deterministic supervisor:
 
+```mermaid
+flowchart TD
+    Q["Customer Query"] --> PRE{{"Guardrail: Pre-check<br/>regex injection scan"}}
+    PRE -- allow --> RET["Retrieval Agent<br/>vector search + LLM relevance filter"]
+    RET <--> QD[("Qdrant Vector Store<br/>chunked KB docs")]
+    RET --> DRAFT["Drafting Agent<br/>tool-calling loop"]
+    DRAFT -- lookup_shipment --> SHIP[("Shipment Repository")]
+    DRAFT -- escalate_to_human --> ESC[("Escalation Desk")]
+    DRAFT --> POL["Policy-Compliance Agent"]
+    POL --> DOCS[("acceptable_use.md +<br/>tracking_policy.md")]
+    POL --> POST{{"Guardrail: Post-check<br/>PII/injection scan + policy verdict"}}
+    POST -- allow / escalate --> FINAL["Final Answer + Citations -> Customer"]
+    PRE -- block --> FINAL
+    PRE -.-> AUDIT[("Audit Log<br/>JSONL, append-only")]
+    POST -.-> AUDIT
+
+    classDef agent fill:#eef2ff,stroke:#4f46e5,color:#312e81
+    classDef guardrail fill:#fff7ed,stroke:#ea580c,color:#7c2d12
+    classDef store fill:#f1f5f9,stroke:#64748b,color:#334155
+    classDef audit fill:#f0fdf4,stroke:#16a34a,color:#14532d
+    classDef io fill:#f8fafc,stroke:#334155,color:#0f172a
+
+    class RET,DRAFT,POL agent
+    class PRE,POST guardrail
+    class QD,SHIP,ESC,DOCS store
+    class AUDIT audit
+    class Q,FINAL io
 ```
-query -> guardrail.pre_check (rule-based, blocks prompt injection)
-      -> RetrievalAgent   (Qdrant vector search -> LLM relevance filter)
-      -> DraftingAgent     (tool-calling: lookup_shipment, escalate_to_human)
-      -> PolicyAgent        (LLM compliance check against acceptable_use.md)
-      -> guardrail.post_check (rule-based PII/injection scan + policy verdict)
-      -> answer, audit record
-```
+
+The supervisor (`src/agents/supervisor.rs`) is what runs this graph -- plain
+Rust control flow, not another LLM call, so *what's allowed through* is
+never itself something the model can be talked out of. The dashed edges are
+the audit trail: every guardrail decision is logged, not just the blocked
+ones.
 
 Every LLM call asks for a schema-validated structured output (via a forced
 tool-call, see `src/llm/client.rs`) rather than free text -- there's no